Having read the investigation report of the sailing yacht SILJA closely its obvious that the Federal Bureau of Maritime Casualty Investigation (BSU) is increasingly relying on AML data and recommends calling 110/112 rather than the MRCC in maritime emergencies, for ships without GMDSS (e.g., radio, EPIRB or DSC) on board. But does this really make sense?
After just over a year, the investigation report of the sailing yacht SILJA and the associated death of a crew member has been published. Along with the investigation report, the BSU (Federal Bureau of Maritime Casualty Investigation) has also released its "Lessons Learned" from this incident.
The Fight for Survival at Sea: What happened on the Sailing Yacht SILJA?
In summary, the sailing yacht SILJA capsized due to short and steep waves in the Accumer Ee (seaway between Baltrum and Langeoog in Germany), during which all three crew members went overboard, but were able to hold on to the keel-up floating yacht afterwards. On board the sailing boat SILJA, there were no maritime distress signals or alerting capabilities according to SOLAS (Safety of Life at Sea) to request appropriate help in an emergency. The sailors only had a smartphone, in a waterproof case with a battery level of 17-20%, available to call for help. The capsized yacht was repeatedly washed over by waves until the yacht eventually sank. The sailors managed to stay together for a while but were ultimately separated and dispersed by the heavy swell.
The Distress Call
At the time when the sailors wanted to make that mayday call, battery life had immensely depleted. With only 3% battery remaining on his waterproof smartphone, the skipper initiated the distress call. He dialled the police emergency number, 110. The connection broke off after 45 seconds, and he attempted a second time. The second attempt also failed, and he attempted a third call, accidentally opening WhatsApp instead and decided to send a voice message to his girlfriend with the relevant distress information. Following this last call, the smartphone battery was entirely depleted and it switched off.
The distress call was received at the Joint Regional Control Centre Ostfriesland (KRLO) at 18:27 on August 26 2021. Wind and background noises rendered the call incomprehensible for the dispatchers. The KRLO is the Joint Regional Control Centre Ostfriesland, responsible for police and rescue command centre (ambulance & fire brigade) matters. At the KRLO, multiple processes were initiated as a result; they listened to the distress call multiple times and initiated a location determination, as no AML data had been transmitted during the call. The abbreviation stands for "Advanced Mobile Location", or a sophisticated mobile location tracking of the smartphone. Thus, rescue coordination centres receive the geographical location of the caller automatically after dialling one of the emergency numbers, but only under certain conditions. Android smartphones mandatorily require internet (WiFi or mobile data) to transmit AML data, while Apple devices transmit data via SMS - equally challenging at sea. Since March 2022, all smartphones distributed in the European market must be AML compatible, and a majority of smartphones already meet these requirements. The situation is different for the police emergency number. Currently, in Germany, only the 112 emergency number stores AML datasets on the central server. According to the police in Lower Saxony, AML will also soon be available nationwide for the 110 emergency number. Independent from the AML datasets, according to §164 paragraph 1 Telecommunications Act TKG, providers must transmit the data initiating the emergency connection, which are necessary for location determination, to emergency numbers 110 and 112. In this case, only the radiation angle (two-dimensional 360 degrees - that is essentially a bearing) from the smartphone to the radio mast was transmitted for position determination.
At 18:47 - 30 minutes after the distress call was received by the KRLO, the case finally reached the MRCC Bremen (German Maritime Search and Rescue Service). The KRLO informed the MRCC about the hard-to-understand call, the possible reference to "Accumer Ee", and the results of the bearing to the radio mast. This initiated the DGzRS's rescue measures for the first time, and their units were immediately dispatched.
Critical Conditions: Rescuers and Sailors Battle the Elements
The weather conditions were challenging for both the rescuers and the sailors in the water. They grappled with wave heights of up to 4m, water temperatures of 18 degrees, and increasing darkness. At 20:58, the SRB ELLI HOFFMANN-RÖSER tried to recover an unresponsive person, but to no avail. The casualty slipped from his lifejacket during the rescue attempt and disappeared into the sea. Shortly after, the SAR helicopter spotted a flashing light in the darkness and rescued a crew member. She reported that her fellow sailor would have been to her left, as she could hear him clearly. He was quickly found due to this now decreased search area, and both could be handed over to hospitals.
Effective Communication at Sea: BSU Emphasises the Importance of 112 for Distress Calls
From the lessons learned of this incident, the BSU recommends that: "For maritime-related distress calls via mobile networks (smartphones, smartwatches, etc.) in the coastal area of EU member states, 112 should always be used. The MRCC's emergency number should generally only be used for subsequent conversations, in the sense of a radio working channel, always assuming that communication via (GMDSS-) maritime radio should not be possible."
This statement from the BSU is based on the possibility of receiving location data, even if the connection should break off (even though this didn't help the sailors in this case). The MRCC doesn't have an "emergency number" as defined by the legislator (TKG), even though the number 124124 (only from the German mobile network) could be mistaken for one. Therefore, the DGzRS - MRCC Bremen has no authorisation to query AML datasets. Though they are currently working on mitigating this problem. Especially because there are many reasons why it would make sense to allow this.
The time loss between transferring the case from the police coordination centre to the MRCC can be decisive. The MRCC Bremen says: "Experience from recent years has shown that initial reports to emergency coordination centres have complicated the process in many cases." The MRCC Bremen cites several reasons for this:
"Employees at the emergency call centres regularly do not have the necessary knowledge and experience in the area of maritime emergency processes and maritime resources to, for example, ask SAR-relevant questions"
Additionally, there are communication losses, as transmissions are only possible by phone due to a lack of digital networking and interfaces.
But What Do We - Really- Learn From the Maritime Emergency?
The Search and Rescue Mission Coordinators (SMC) have years of experience with the German Search and Rescue Region. There are many locations which, due to their intricacies, are frequently reported by distressed persons over the phone or radio as incident positions. The MRCC staff are familiar with these, and perhaps the MRCC could have deciphered the distress call sooner than someone not mentally prepared for a maritime emergency and the corresponding sea areas. According to the MRCC's statement, they consider a dedicated emergency number to be urgently necessary. Or perhaps one could simply equip their boat with a bit more safety equipment, which is also SOLAS approved and automatically emits a distress signal when capsized.
You can find the entire BSU report at: https://www.bsu-bund.de/SharedDocs/pdf/EN/Investigation_Report/2022/Investigation_Report_276_21.pdf?__blob=publicationFile&v=1
The corresponding Lessons Learned at: https://www.bsu-bund.de/SharedDocs/pdf/EN/Lessons_learned/Lessons_Learned_14.pdf?__blob=publicationFile&v=1
*all quotes are from the BSU accident investigation report 276/21 and the BSU Lessons Learned published on 08.12.2022 (GER) & 29.03.2023 (ENG)